Results and conclusions: An approach to predicting the vertical disparity for model-based stereo correspondence has been described. This predctor is based on the fact that the vertical disparity depends very weakly on the depth structure of the scene [2] under certain conditions. The vertical disparity is approximated by a quadratic expression of image eccentricities x and y. The coefficiencies in the expression can be estimated from the object structure model by the linear least square. 
A constraint based on this prediction is constructed, and this further reduce the ambiguity of the epipolar geometry constraint, therefore yielding a robust and efficient solution to the stereo correspondence problem.
Introduction: Applying algebraic codes in cryptography is a concept that was first introduced by McEliece [I] . Since then many public and private-key cryptosystem variants of that system have been introduced [2] . This Letter is concerned with the security of a recent private-key cryptosystem based on single burst-correcting array codes proposed in [3] .
System: The system is based on array codes. In these codes, data to be encoded are first fed into a 2D k, x k2 array. Two single parity check codes are then applied to the rows and columns, respectively. That is, the code accepts k = k,k2 information bits and produces n = (k, + l)(k, + 1) coded bits. The code can correct a single random error with the capability of correcting a burst of errors if the encoded data are read diagonaily. In particular, if k2 2 2(k, -l), a burst of length up to k, can be corrected [4] . The idea of the system is to first encode the data, add a single burst of length less than or equal to the burst correcting capability of the code, then permute to obtain the encrypted data. The ciphertext vector c is given by
where G is the generator matrix of the array code, P is n x n permutation matrix, U and z are the information and error vectors, respectively. For security purposes, z is uniformly chosen from the set of all n-binary vectors of weight w, that is greater than or equal to a minimum value w , , , , and of length 1 that is less than or equal td the length b of the maximum correctable burst. For the system, both G and P are kept private. In the decryption process, c is first multiplied by PI, and the result is then decoded for U.
System security: The system seems to be secure against known attacks usually applied on systems of similar structure [3] . Constructing the private keys of the system in a chosen plaintext attack seems to be difficult. However, it is possible to construct an equivalent generator matrix G,, = GP. For example, the ith, i = 1, 2, ..., k row of Geg can be constructed by first driving the system a sufficiently large number of times by a unit weight binary vector of the form (0, 0, ..., 1, ..., 0) with the one at the ith position and then taking the majority at each position among the resulting vectors. Here, however, we present a new chosen plaintext attack that allows for the construction of all the private keys of the system.
Attack for constructing P:
The attack is based on the observation that driving the system by a zero plaintext input results in revealing information about the manner by which b consecutive positions in the codeword are mapped into b positions in the ciphertext vector. Let the positions in the ciphertext vector be numbered consecutively from 1 to n. That is, the first position in c is numbered 1, the second 2 and so on. The system is assumed to be driven by a sufficiently large number of zero-information blocks and that the positions of the nonzero elements resulting from every encryption process are stored in a separate set. From these sets, a group of n new sets is then formed by taking, for every i, i = 1, 2, ..., n, the union of all the sets that contain position i as one of their elements. Let these sets be P,, j = 1, 2, ..., n rearranged in a list such that P,,, differs from P, in only two elements and that P,-, # P,,,. Each set will have 2b -1 elements. We note here that since the difference between any two consecutive sets in the list is two elements, these sets must have resulted from bursts starting at two adjacent positions in the codeword. The intersection of any 2b -1 consecutive set in the list will be one element. Starting with some set in the list, say the one with index i, and taking this intersection results in an element that corresponds to some mapping of a codeword position. Conversely, taking this intersection starting at the set with index i + 1 will result in the mapping of the adjacent codeword position. In general, sliding a window of sue 2b ~ 1 over the list one set at a time in a cyclic fashion and taking the intersection of these sets each time results in sufficient information for constructing P. The above is summarised by the following algorithm:
for i := 1 to n do begin
where ((x)) denotes (x ~ 1) mod n + 1 of the index x. In this case, Note that by not allowing the zero information vector will not prevent such an attack. In fact, any nonzero information vector can be used. Assuming that Geq is available ZP is then given by c @ uGeq. Upon the construction of P and Geq, G can be obtained by multiplying Geq by PI.
Expected number of required plaintext-ciphertext pairs: Detennining the expected number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, or simply pairs, required to construct P can be of interest. For analysis tractableness, some approximations have been used. If the bursts were all ones and are all of equal length, then a single visit by a burst to every position in the codeword is sufficientlor constructing the permutation matrix. The expected number, R I , required is therefore given by [5] n-1 n n--2
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Now consider the case when the bits within a burst of length 1 starting at position i are generated randomly and let (bt, b((z+l)), ...,   b,,,+,_,,,) be such bits. Here, we assume, as in [3] , that b, = b~ct+,-l,, = 1 while the others are random. 1, however, is random. Therefore, for a burst of length b starting at position i it is reasonable to assume that the first bit is of value one while the other bits are random. Let V be a random variable denoting the number of times that an arbitrary position, say i, of the codeword is to be selected so that a value of one is generated at least once in all the ((i +2) 
The number R, of pairs required until each position of the codeword is being selected at least v times is random. Since the selection process is uniform, each position will have a chance of lin of being selected. The number of pairs required for a single visit by a burst to a particular position is approximated here by a geometric distribution with parameter lin. The number of pairs required until a position is being selected v times by the negative binomial distribution has parameters (v, lin). Let R,, i = 1 , 2, ..., n be such random variables and these be independent identically distributed each with a probability mass function P R , (~, , v) given by
In this case R, is
with a probability mass function PR(r, v) given by Table 1 . Column 4 of the Table shows the number of pairs required for the construction of P when the burst length and Table 1 : Number of pairs required to construct P for different array codes weight are both b (= k J , while column 7 shows this number when the bursts are generated randomly. For codes of length up to 544 that are of practical interest, < 10000 cipher runs with zero inputs are sufficient on the average for the reconstruction of P. These numbers are in the practical range. If the cipher, for example, is used to encrypt data files in a computer, then obtaining such information is feasible.
Conclusions: A chosen plaintext attack on cryptosystems based on single burst-correcting array-codes is presented that allows the construction of all the private keys of such systems.
